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DRAFT

September 14, 1989
EXISTING LEGAL TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
DIFFERENTIAL, CONTEXTUAL, AND ABSOLUTE NORMS

by Daniel Barstow Magraw
Associate Professor of Law
University of Colorado*

I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Analytic Framework:

Types of Norms

The treatment and role of developing countries^ arise in
virtually every discussion of international environmental
protection and resource management.

These serious and difficult

issues must be confronted successfully in order to realize
effective international solutions.

This paper analyzes the

existing international legal regime regarding those issues.
For purposes of this paper, there are, generally speaking,
three types of treatment that international law can provide
developing countries.

The first is what I refer to as

"differential" treatment, by which I mean treatment according to
a norm that on its face provides different, presumably more
advantageous, standards for developing countries than for
developed countries.

An example of a differential norm is that

contained in the 1985 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, which allows developed countries 5 years
to decrease pollution to a specified level, but developing
countries 10 years to reach that same level.^
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The second type of treatment is what I refer to as

^

"contextual" treatment, by which I mean treatment according to a
norm that on its face provides identical treatment to developing
and developed countries but the application of which requires (or
at least permits) consideration of factors that might vary from
country to country and that correspond typically, but not
unvaryingly, to the development level of a country.

An example

of a contextual norm is the World Heritage Convention's
requirement that a country, in protecting natural and cultural
heritage, "do all it can to this end, to the utmost of its
■3

resources."J
The third type of treatment is what I refer to as "absolute"
treatment, by which I mean treatment according to a norm that
provides identical treatment to developed and developing

<

countries and which does not require or permit consideration of
factors that vary between countries.

An example of an absolute

norm is the 1987 Nuclear Accident Notification Convention's
requirement of immediate notification of pending transboundary
harm.
This paper examines existing international norms with
respect to the extent to which they require or otherwise provide
a basis for according these different types of treatment to
developing countries.
B.

Non-legal Considerations

Before addressing those questions, it is useful to mention
some related approaches that one can take to thinking about the

€
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treatment of developing countries with respect to environmental
norms.
From a political perspective, there are two points to note.
First, at the international level, developing countries comprise
more than a majority of the world's approximately 165 countries,
and they contain more than three-quarters of the world's
population.

Developing countries are significant to developed

countries such as the United States in many arenas not expressly
involving the environment.
will only note the obvious:

I will not dwell on this aspect, but
developing countries' claims can not

be ignored.
The second point to make about political considerations
concerns the domestic level.

Political leaders in developing

countries face tremendous pressures to accomplish short-term
economic development, even if that involves sacrificing the
environment.

The importance of "sustainable development," as

that term is used in the Report of the Brundtland Commission,^
and the dependence of long-term economic development on
environmental protection are increasingly accepted by developingcountry leaders.
masses.

But that recognition has not yet spread to the

Until it does (and perhaps even thereafter), impatience

and resultant political pressure will be the rule.

In the

absence of special incentives, expecting that developing-country
political leaders will surmount that pressure in the interests of
the global environment, or even their own country's sustainable
development, is probably naive.

3

From a practical (non-political) perspective, developing

1r

countries are the source of much of the world's pollution and
contain much of the world's population and natural resources.
International environmental measures thus must involve the
continued participation of developing countries in order to be
effective.

Equally significant, but with different implications,

is the reality that developing countries face greater
difficulties than do developed countries with respect to managing
environmental problems.

Developing countries may not have

sufficient information to predict the potential for transboundary
harm created by activities within its territory of foreign or
foreign-owned entities because the country may not receive full
information from such an entity.

A developing country may not

have sufficient technical expertise to evaluate complex

,

technological proposals or to monitor on-going performance,
especially (as is often the case) where control of the day-to-day
operations is effectively in the hands of foreigners.

A

developing country may lack regulatory and administrative skills
necessary to effectuate pollution-control laws, or may not have
the legislative-drafting skills and experience necessary to draft
adequate laws.

Moreover, developing countries may face an

unusually high risk of suffering transboundary harm from illplanned or hazardous activities of neighbors, because the
neighboring countries are typically developing countries and
because the governments or people of the affected developing
country are typically not as aware of the potential harm, or as
able to detect, monitor, or remedy such harm.

4
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From a moral perspective, an urgent and undeniable
imperative exists that the standard of living of the world's
poorest people be improved.

Roughly one billion people live in

what Robert McNamara has described as "absolute poverty," that
is, in a form of existence so characterized by malnutrition,
exposure to the elements, disease, and illiteracy, that it is
below any reasonable standard of human decency.5

The moral

imperative to alleviate absolute poverty has profound
implications for international environmental law.

On the one

hand, it means that the situation international law must deal
with is more complicated and threatening:

improving the absolute

poor's standard of living will inevitably require increased
energy use and greater demands on natural resources.

On the

other hand, the moral imperative places a constraint on the means
international law can use to deal with that worsening situation:
environmental norms must be structured so as to minimize
interference with the effort to lift people from absolute
poverty.
Moral philosophy may also have other implications regarding
the extent to which developing and developed countries should be
subject to the same international environmental standards.

One

might make an argument based on the philosophy of John Locke
(1632-1704) that developing countries are not entitled to any
differential treatment.

The Lockean principle of acquisition

from a commons permits one to appropriate or use a resource
provided that one does not take more than one can use without
waste and that after one's acquisition there is "enough, and as
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good left in common for others."^

How much it is permissible to

take will depend on how many others want to use the resource and
on how much they are likely to need or want.

Presumably the

Lockean principle covers using an area like the sea as a disposal
site.

If there are only a few other polluters around, say, the

Mediterranean, and if they are only likely to want to put small
amounts of pollutants into the sea, then country A may be able to
put in a large amount of pollutant (call this amount N) without
violating the Lockean condition.

Later, when there are many more

countries putting pollutants into the Mediterranean, another
country B may not be able to dispose of an amount as large as N
without running afoul of the Lockean proviso.

Country B then has

no complaint that A used to be able to dispose the greater amount
N, or that A was able to dispose a greater aggregate amount over
time by having an earlier need for disposal.
The Lockean proviso, however, cuts in the other direction as
well.

Suppose that A continues to dispose of amount N every year

even while new polluters in order to avoid violating the Lockean
proviso have to dispose of less than N per year.

Here the newer

polluters have grounds to complain that there is no longer any
basis for A's claim that it is entitled to dispose of amount N.
A, like the other polluters, is only entitled to contribute an
amount that takes into account the number of parties wanting to
make use of the commons.
Consider this problem in a real case.

Many scientists think

that uncontrolled forest burning in the Western part of Brazil
contributes a significant amount to global warming.

6

Countries

^

that industrialized earlier than Brazil and whose fossil fuel use
contributes much of the rest of the problem, might complain that
Brazil cannot make this large deposition of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere without violating the Lockean proviso.
this would be correct.

Surely

But Brazil would also be correct in

responding that other countries can no longer put as much carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere as they were once free to do.

Brazil

would be correct, that is, in appealing to the Lockean proviso in
demanding that cuts be multilateral rather than limited to Brazil
alone.
But might Brazil be able to use Locke to argue further that
developed countries should cut back more than Brazil, on the
grounds that the need to develop economically (or to benefit
Brazil's absolute poor) should be considered in determining what
is "enough"?

Such an argument would be buttressed by moral

conclusions drawn from the imperative to improve the standard of
living of those living in absolute poverty, from a philosophical
approach that generally favors access to resources based on need
(Brazil's needs are greater than those of developed countries),
from a philosophical approach centered on ability (developed
countries generally have more resources and technical capacity to
combat international environmental degradation than Brazil has),
or from a philosophical approach that emphasizes who caused the
problem in question (anthropogenic activities in developed
countries have historically contributed more to global warming
than have anthropogenic activities in Brazil).

7

This article is not the appropriate place for a full
if
exploration of the problems of fairness between developing and
developed countries in distributing the burdens of dealing with
transboundary environmental problems.

But it is appropriate to

assert that these fairness issues will have to be taken
seriously, and that it will not be plausible for developed
countries to insist that they should be allowed to continue
contributing as much pollution as they did just because they
started doing it first.
C.

Organization of This Article

One hopes, of course, for a consonance between the
international legal regime -- as it presently exists and as it
evolves in the future -- and the political, practical, and moral
considerations just mentioned.

The remainder of this article

i
t

examines the existing international legal regime with respect to
the two types of treatment mentioned above -- differential
treatment and contextual treatment.
as follows.

The discussion is organized

Part II examines the efforts to promote economic

development and to protect international human rights.

Part III

examines four customary international environmental law
principles:

reasonable and equitable use of a shared natural

resource; state responsibility for causing significant injury to
another state's environment or to global commons; the duty to
cooperate; and the duty to compensate for transboundary harm even
when the activity causing the harm is permitted to continue by
international law.

Part IV examines six conventional regimes

t
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dealing with transboundary environmental problems.

Part V

contains the Conclusion.

II.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS
The major post-World War II efforts to promote economic

development, to protect the environment, and to foster
international human rights are related on many levels.

At a

substantive level, all three share a concern for health and
safety, and all three are primarily directed at benefiting
individuals, rather than states.

The following discussion

explores whether the economic-development and human-rights
efforts also share a common concern for developing countries in
the context of environmental protection and, if so, how that
concern is expressed normatively.

A.

Efforts to Promote Economic Development

Efforts to promote economic development began in earnest
immediately after World War II, with references to improved
standards of living in the United Nation's Charter and the
formation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.

These efforts were followed, in 1974, by the formal

call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The call for
NIEO was contained in three United Nations General Assembly
resolutions:

the Declaration on the Establishment of a New

International Economic Order;

the Programme of Action on the

Establishment of a New International Economic Order;® and the
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Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS).^

The

thrust of NIEO is that the Third World must develop, that the gap
between the developed and the developing countries must narrow,
and that there should be a transfer of resources from the
developed countries to the developing countries to accomplish
those ends.

NIEO is thus firmly based on the notion of

differential treatment of developing countries.

Moreover, each

of the three basic documents expressly states that developing
countries should be treated in a beneficial manner.^

Most

significantly, article 30 of CERDS expressly requires
differential treatment in the context of state responsibility for
protecting the environment:
The protection, preservation and enhancement of the
environment for the present and future generations is the
responsibility of all States. All States shall endeavour to
establish their own environmental and developmental policies
in conformity with such responsibility.
The environmental
policies of all States should enhance and not adversely
affect the present and future development potential of
developing countries, All States have the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. All
States should co-operate in evolving international norms and
regulations in the field of the environment.
NIEO also contains elements of contextual treatment.

Each

of the three basic NIEO resolutions repeatedly refers to "equity"
1
and "equitable." 1J

As is evident from many opinions of the

International Court of Justice, including the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases^ and the Tunisia-Libya continntal shelf
case,

these concepts require consideration of the facts and

circumstances of the particular situation under examination.

As
4
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Judge Jimenez de Ar6chaga stated in an individual opinion in the
Tunisia-Libya case:16
To resort to equity means, in effect, to appreciate and
balance the relevant circumstances of the case, so as to
render justice, not through the rigid application of general
rules and principles and of formal legal concepts, but
through an adaptation and adjustment of such principles,
rules and concepts to the facts, realities and circumstances
of each case....
In other words, the judicial application
of equitable principles means that a court should render
justice in the concrete case, by means of a decision shaped
by and adjusted to the relevant "factual matrix" of that
case. Equity is here nothing other than the taking into
account of a complex of historical and geographical
circumstances the consideration of which does not diminish
justice but, on the contrary, enriches it.
• ••
All the relevant circumstances are to be considered and
balanced; they are to be thrown together into the crucible
and their interaction will yield the correct equitable
solution of each individual case.
The concepts of "equity" and "equitable" thus mandate that the
individual characteristics of developing countries to be taken
into account.

At least one of the references in CERDS refers to

sharing benefits derived from natural resources, indicating that
contextual treatment is relevant both to environmental and nonenvironmental issues.1
7
As is well-known, the NIEO resolutions contained several
controversial elements, and the resolutions were not adopted
unanimously.

CERDS, for example, was approved by a vote of 120

in favor, 6 opposed (including the United States), and 10
io
abstaining.
Considerable literature exists about whether NIEO
constitutes international law and, phrased differently, whether
there exists an international right to development.*^
attempt to resolve that debate in this article.
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I will not

Rather, I would point out that the dialogue about the
importance and goals of the economic development effort now is
phrased in terms of "sustainable development," as that term is
used in the Report of the Brundtland Commission, and that,
regardless of whether NIEO constitutes international law in a
strict or "hard" sense, the vast majority of multilateral
treaties since 1974 -- environmental and non-environmental -have expressly referred to the needs of developing countries and
frequently have made some specific provision for them.2
0

Time

has not permitted either a complete perusal of all such
conventions or of the accompanying opinio juris.

It nevertheless

seems possible to assert an existing or emerging customary
international norm that international conventional regimes -environmental and other —

should, as a general matter, take the

interests of developing countries into account, even if the
details of that consideration may be no more definable than by a
reference to the obligation to take those interests into account
in good faith -- the obligation of good faith being itself a
contextual norm.2
1
Such "soft" obligations raise several questions and have
raised some objections.

Indeed, soft law has been called the

"Trojan horse of environmental law."
distinguished:

Two issues should be

whether there is any legal obligation and whether

a legal obligation is defined in hard-edged terms.22

It seems to

me that the obligation mentioned earlier in this paragraph is a
legal obligation, not just a moral one, but that its content is

not hard-edged in its clarity and ease of application.

In the

latter sense only, therefore, can it be said to be soft law.
If NIEO has crystallized into customary law, for example in
the express terms of CERDS, the obligation to provide either
differential treatment or contextual treatment (the choice would
depend on the issue) would be clear.

CERDS article 30's

requirement, quoted above, that environmental policies not
adversely affect developing countries' development potential,
would be especially pertinent.

B.

International Human Rights

The post-World War II movement to establish and protect
international human rights encompasses several rights directly
related to environmental concerns.

Article 1(3) of the United

Nations Charter states as a purpose of the United Nations "To
achieve international co-operation . . .

in promoting and

encouraging respect for human rights . . ."; Article 55 states
that "the United Nations shall promote . . . higher standards of
living . . ., solutions of international . . . health, and
related problems; and international cultural . . . cooperation";
and Article 56 pledges United Nations members to cooperate to
achieve the goals of Article 55.2
3

The Universal Declaration of

Human Rights provides that everyone:

"is entitled to

realization, through national effort and international co
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources
of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
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personality"

(art. 22); has the right to "just and favourable
$

conditions of work" (art. 23); has the right to "a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his
family" (art. 25); and has the right "freely to participate in
the cultural life of the community" (art. 27).24

The

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(the "Covenant") provides:

that the members to the Covenant

"recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular . . .
Safe and healthy working conditions"

(art. 7); the right to "an

adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions"

(art. 11(1)); the obligation to

improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of
food . . .

by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a

way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization
of natural resources"

(art. 11(2)(a)); and that members

"recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health"

(art. 12(1))

and the obligation, in attempting to achieve that right, to take
steps for "[t]he improvement of all aspects of environmental and
industrial hygiene [and] [t]he prevention, treatment and control
of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases"

(art.

12(2)(a),(b)).25
It thus is evident that there exist human rights to just and
favourable conditions of work, an adequate standard of living,
health, and participation in and enjoyment of the fruits of

14

$

culture.

The human rights just enumerated clearly are related to

the natural and cultural environment and have most probably
passed beyond the stage of being only conventional norms to
become customary international law.26

Some authors have even

argued that there has evolved a human right to a clean and
healthy environment.27
As a general matter, countries are required to work towards
providing the rights enumerated in the three documents described
above to their own nationals and to participate in international
efforts to provide these rights to persons everywhere.
process is referred to as "progressive realization."

This
8
2

However,

the statement of countries' obligations contained in Article 2 of
the Covenant -- which is the latest and most precise of the three
documents —

is more exact.

Each member is required to take

steps "to the maximum of its available resources" (art. 2(1)).
This is an example of contextual treatment.
to state:

Article 2 continues

"Developing countries, with due regard to human rights

and their national economy, may determine to what extent they
would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present
Covenant to non-nationals."29

This is an example of differential

treatment to developing countries, albeit differential treatment
that does not place any obligation on developed countries.

The

Covenant thus supports both types of distinction examined in this
paper.
In addition, if the rights described above are part of
customary international law and if every country -- including
developed countries -- has the obligation to participate
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internationally to achieve those rights for all people, including
those in developing countries, there may be an obligation that
developed countries assist developing countries in meeting
international environmental norms.

If so, this is another

example of differential treatment for developing countries:

the

differential treatment would be the obligation to provide
financial, material, or technological aid to developing countries
to help them satisfy international environmental standards.

III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES SPECIFICALLY
RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT
Substantial dispute exists regarding whether there exist
general customary norms relating to the environment and regarding
the precise content of those norms, assuming they exist.

For

example, Professor Johan Lammers has compiled a partial list of
principles or concepts that have been invoked to attack or defend
the alleged legality under international law of instances of
transboundary pollution; this partial list has 25 entries.30
Nevertheless, there are some formulations of international
environmental norms that would receive widespread, though not
universal, approval.

Four of those formulations are discussed

below.

A.

Reasonable and Equitable Use of a Shared Natural
Resource

Under this principle, states are entitled, in their own
territory, to "a reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial
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uses of a transboundary natural r e s o u r c e . "
This principle does
1
3
not provide differential treatment to developing countries.

But

the determination of whether a particular use is "reasonable"
takes into account all relevant facts and circumstances,
including the social and economic needs and conditions of the
states concerned.32

This principle, which is an example of

contextual treatment, thus could result in different rights for
use to two countries that are sharing a resource and that are
similar in all ways except their development status.

B.

State Responsibility for Causing Significant Injury
to Another State's Environment or to Global Commons

Many authorities agree that a state is responsible under
international law if activities within its jurisdiction or
control cause significant injury in or to the territory of
another state.

That principle was stated clearly by the

international arbitral tribunal in the oft-cited Trail Smelter
case:
[U]nder the principles of international law . . . no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another State or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 33
An aspect of this principle may also be found in the Corfu
Channel case:

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated as

a "general and well-recognized principle," "every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
contrary to the rights of other S t a t e s . I n

the Lake Lanoux

case, the ICJ discussed the general obligation to negotiate in
17

good faith and stated the requirement that a potential source
(
(upstream) state take "into consideration in a reasonable manner
the interests of the downstream S t a t e . T
5
3
"he Trail Smelter
principle was reaffirmed by implication in the Nuclear Tests
case, but there was no express statement of the rule.3
6
By their terms, none of these four cases require
differential treatment of developing countries.

The only

apparent way in which the Trail Smelter case requires contextual
treatment is the requirement that the "case [be of] serious
consequence" -- a determination that presumably would vary
according to the injured country's particular situation.

The

Lake Lanoux case, with its reference to "reasonable," clearly
requires a contextual analysis.
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human

^

Environment contains a more generalized (i.e., not fume-specific)
version of the Trail Smelter principle, but it expresses that
principle in tandem with the principle that states have the right
to exploit their own natural resources:3
7
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
It is arguable that Principle 21 states a balancing test that
would weigh a state's right to exploit its resources against its
obligation not to cause transboundary harm and which thus would
necessitate a contextual analysis that presumably would consider
the importance of the right to the source (upstream) state and
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i

the significance of the injury to the affected (downstream)
state.

That appears to be the position of the United States:38

. . . Principle 21 . . . maintains a careful balance between
the sovereign right of a State to exploit its resources and
its responsibility to avoid serious transboundary pollution.
The principle does not purport to resolve (or even address)
the issue of the extent to which the State's rights are
circumscribed by its responsibility. As such, there must be
a balancing between a State's right to act and another
State's right not to be affected, on which there is no clear
cut answer. This is consistent with a State's
responsibility to exercise due diligence to avoid
deleterious transboundary impacts on another. . . .
While that interpretation is not implausible, substantial
evidence exists that the better interpretation is that the
prohibition on causing transboundary harm is a limitation on a
state's right to exploit its resources.

For example, the U.N.

General Assembly stated in December 1972 in the Resolution on
Cooperation between States in the Field of the Environment "That,
in the exploration, exploitation and development of their natural
resources, States must not produce significant harmful effects in
zones situated outside their national jurisdiction."39

Further

support for this interpretation is provided by the International
Law Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration, which does not
juxtapose the state's right to exploit its resources:40
The protection, preservation and enhancement of the natural
environment for the present and future generations is the
responsibility of all States. All States have the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. All States should co-operate in
evolving international norms and regulations in the field.
Article 30 of CERDS, quoted above,^ provides additional support,
as does the Helsinki Final Act:

"...

each of the

participating States, in accordance with the principles of
19

international law, ought to ensure . . . that activities carried
out on its territory do not cause degradation of the environment
in another State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."
2
4
Under this interpretation of Principle 21, which I believe
to be correct, one contextual analysis would concern whether a
particular harmful effect would be "significant" -- similar to
the discussion above about the requirement of seriousness in the
Trail Smelter principle.

Other contextual aspects may also be

present, depending on how closely the rule in Principle 21 is
akin to a due care (or due diligence) standard, and on whether a
state is responsible only if the harm is reasonably
foreseeable.43

The latter inquiry would be contextual because of

the reasonableness element.

A due care (or due diligence)

standard would be contextual because accountability would arise
only if the source state acted or refrained from acting
intentionally or negligently -- the determination of which
requires a contextual analysis examining factors such as the
nature of the activity, the potential harm, and the costs of
preventing that harm (including benefits that would be foregone,
for example if the activity were to cease altogether).44
Principle 21 does not mention developing countries, and does
thus not provide differential treatment.

Principle 23 of the

Stockholm Declaration, however, does provide for such treatment,
as well as providing individualized (contextual) treatment:
4
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed
upon by the international community, or to standards which
will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential
in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in
20

each country, and the extent of the applicability of
standards which are valid for the most advanced countries
but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social
cost for the developing countries.
Principle 23 thus is another example of state practice providing
differential treatment to developing countries and contextual
treatment.
The recent Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States contains contextual norms as its primary
international environmental rule:46
§ 601.

State Obligations with Respect to Environment of
Other States and the Common Environment

(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may
be necessary, to the extent practicable under the
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control
(a)

(b)
(2)
(a)
(b)

conform to generally accepted international rules
and standards for the prevention, reduction, and
control of injury to the environment of another
state or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction; and
are conducted so as not to cause significant
injury to the environment of another state or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
A state is responsible to all other states
for any violation of its obligations under
Subsection (l)(a), and
for any significant injury, resulting from such
violation, to the environment of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.

(3) A state is responsible for any significant injury,
resulting from a violation of its obligations under
Subsection (1), to the environment of another state or to
its property, or to persons or property within that state's
territory or under its jurisdiction or control.
The phrase in paragraph (1) "to the extent practicable under the
circumstances" clearly calls for a contextual analysis.

The

requirement of "significant" injury in paragraphs (l)(b) and
(2)b) also necessitates a contextual analysis, as described
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above.47

Moreover, the Comments state that "In all cases [a

defense is available if the] injury was due to the failure of the
injured state to exercise reasonable care to avoid the threatened
harm."48
analysis.

Such a reasonableness standard calls for a contextual
Section 601 and the accompanying Comments and

Reporters' Notes do not provide any indication that differential
treatment of developing countries is called for.

C.

Obligation to Cooperate

Much authority exists for the proposition that states are
obligated to cooperate in managing transboundary pollution.
Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy has formulated this principle in the
following terms:49
1. States have the obligation to co-operate, in a
spirit of solidarity, with one another as well as with
competent international organizations with a view to
preventing, diminishing and eliminating transfrontier
pollution.
2. To discharge this obligation, States inform and
consult one another, in all good faith, on their activities
or measures, undertaken or projected, that are likely to
cause transfrontier pollution.
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 above, States
inform one another on their respective pollution prevention
policies, consult with one another about all questions
likely to arise between them in connection with the
management of their environments and take concerted action
aimed at harmonizing their environmental policies.
No formulation of the obligation to cooperate with which I
am familiar requires, by its terms, differential treatment of
developing countries; but it seems to me that the exact form
cooperation takes in a particular situation must necessarily be
contextual, i.e., that what is appropriate and required will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each transboundary
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situation.

For example, the kind of information or technical

assistance the United States might be obligated to give to Canada
regarding a particular transboundary threat might vary from that
required to be provided to Mexico in an otherwise similar
situation because of differences in language, technical
expertise, regulatory experience, cultural patterns, agricultural
practices and products, ecosystem susceptibilities, climate
patterns, etc.

D.

The Duty to Compensate for Transboundary Harm Even When
the Activity Causing the Harm Is Permitted to Continue
by International Law

Situations requiring compensation but in which the harmful
activity is permitted to continue, are the subject of controversy
regarding whether they are covered by the principle of state
responsibility discussed in part III.B, above, or whether they
are governed by a different form of state accountability, usually
referred to as "international l i a b i l i t y That
0
5
"
.
dispute is, by
and large, irrelevant to this paper because proponents of both
positions agree that there are some situations in which states
are accountable to compensate another state for transboundary
environmental harm even though the harmful activity is allowed by
international law to continue.51

Indeed, the Trail Smelter case

is an example of exactly that situation:

the tribunal held that

Canada must compensate the United States for any future damage
that occurred even after the smelter was brought into compliance
with the minimum operating standards set by the tribunal.52
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One element of the forementioned dispute that is relevant is
the question of what standard should be applied in determining
whether a situation exists requiring compensation but allowing
the harmful activity to continue.

Some argue that the

appropriate standard is one of strict (or absolute) liability for
ultrahazardous activities.

On its face, that standard requires
3
5

neither differential treatment nor contextual treatment.

On

closer analysis, however, it seems to me that a contextual
analysis is called for, because otherwise how can it be
determined either that an activity is or is not ultrahazardous
(presumably, activities' dangers vary according to realistic
appraisals of factors such as operating conditions and operator
skills) or that its social worth justifies its continuance in
54
spite of the harm it is causing.
Others argue that accountability for injury from acts that
are nevertheless permitted to continue by international law is
(or should be) based on a contextual analysis taking into account
a wide variety of factors, and encompasses (or should encompass)
activities that are not ultrahazardous.

An example of this view

is the approach of the U.N. International Law Commission (ILC)
with respect to "international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international
law."

According to the work of the first Special Rapporteur,

Robert Quentin Quentin-Baxter, if transboundary harm with a
physical consequence occurs and if no governing conventional
regime has been agreed to, the states involved must negotiate in
good faith to determine their rights and obligations, and

reparations are required unless that would be inconsistent with
the states' shared expectations.

The amount of reparations (if

required) is to be determined by balance-of-interests tests,
possibly taking into account the states' previous behavior, their
shared expectations, and several specified "principles,"
"factors," and " m a t t e r s . 55 contextual analysis clearly was
required.

In addition, though Professor Quentin-Baxter did not

expressly call for differential treatment for developing
countries, some of the variables to be considered were most
probably directed at ensuring that particular characteristics of
developing countries be considered.

For example, "standards of

adequate protection should be determined with due regard to the
importance of the activity and its economic viability [and]
should take into account the means at the disposal of the acting
State . . . ."56
The ILC's approach to the international liability topic has
shifted under the current (second) Special Rapporteur, Julio
Barboza.

Ambassador Barboza proposed ten draft articles in 1988

that do not concur precisely with Professor Quentin-Baxter's
approach.

They do appear to contain contextual elements and to

be directed at protecting developing countries.

The draft

articles apply only to activities that create an "appreciable
risk of causing transboundary injury," and "risk" is to be
determined with reference to whether the relevant substance's
physical properties, "considered either intrinsically or in
relation to the place, environment or way in which they are used,
make them highly likely to cause transboundary injury . . . ."57
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The explanation and examples of this determination do not suggest
a broad contextual analysis, nor do they contain aspects that
relate characteristically to developing countries, but neither do
they expressly exclude consideration of such factors.58

That

such factors might be relevant is suggested by other parts of the
draft and the accompanying commentary.

Article 3, for example,

states that the draft's obligations apply to a state only if "it
cq
knew or had means of knowing" of a potentially injurious act.
In explaining this article, Ambassador Barboza states that "its
primary aim is to protect developing countries, which sometimes
lack the means to be aware of everything that goes on within
their territory . . . ."60

other draft provisions requiring a

contextual analysis but whose terms do not provide differential
treatment, are those regarding the obligations to cooperate in
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good faith, to prevent injury, and to make reparations.61

IV.

CONVENTIONAL REGIMES DEALING WITH TRANSBOUNDARY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
As indicated above, it has become common for multilateral

conventions of all types at least to mention the need to take
into account the needs of developing countries, and many
conventions have gone further to provide either differential
treatment or contextual treatment.

In this part, I describe

several multilateral environmental conventions with respect to
whether they provide differential or contextual treatment.

Time

has not permitted a full examination of all multilateral
environmental treaties, but I believe that the selection herein
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is representative of such treaties.

At the least, it provides

examples of some of the most important normative responses to the
Third World's situation.

The conventions are examined

chronologically.

A.

1972 Convention on the International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects

This Convention does not specifically mention developing
countries or provide differential treatment to them; indeed
article 2 specifies a standard of absolute liability on the part
of the launching state.6
2

Two norms, however, are contextual.

Article 10 deals with time limits on making claims; it allows an
extension of up to one year after the date the injured state
"could reasonably be expected to have learned of the facts."
Perhaps more significantly, article 12 states that the amount of
compensation that is due "shall be determined in accordance with
international law and the principles of justice and equity."

The

reference to "justice and equity" presumably calls for a
contextual analysis.63

But that analysis may be limited by the

further statement in article 12 that the compensation should
"restore [the injured person] to the condition which would have
existed if the damage had not occurred."
The Space Object Liability Convention thus contains both
contextual and absolute norms.

The contextual norms --

"reasonably be expected" and "justice and equity" —

are

objective rather than subjective, i.e., they depend on the
perspective not of the acting State or of the injured State, but
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rather on a perspective external to those States.

On the other

hand, it seems highly probable that the individual
characteristics, knowledge, and motives of the States involved
would be taken into account in making that external analysis.
The norms thus effectively take into account relevant differences
between developed and developing countries.

The absence of

differential norms, which would be another way of considering
those differences, is notable; this Convention antedated by two
years the formal call for NIEO.

B.

The World Heritage Convention

The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage does not mention developing
countries per se, but it states in its Preamble that national
protection of natural and cultural heritage "often remains
incomplete because of . . . the insufficient economic, scientific
and technical resources of the country where the property [is]"
and that it is "incumbent on the international community . . .
grant[] collective assistance . . . ."64

to

That obligation to

provide assistance is elaborated in the Convention's normative
provisions.

Article 6 "recognize[s ] the duty of the

international community to cooperate" and, more specifically,
that each member state "undertakes to give help" if requested to
by the state in which the heritage is located.

(As indicated in

the following paragraph, article 4 is unusual in that it imposes
a reciprocal duty to utilize any assistance which the state in
which the heritage is located "may be able to obtain.")
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Article

7 states the understanding that international protection of
natural and cultural heritage includes establishing "a system of
international cooperation and assistance."

Article 13(4)

provides that the World Heritage Committee established by the
Convention shall determine its priorities with reference to,
inter alia, the resources and capabilities of the states in which
threatened heritage is located.

And Article 21 provides that the

World Heritage Committee should evaluate requests for assistance
from the Fund established by Convention with respect, inter alia,
to the "reasons why the resources of the State requesting
assistance do not allow it to meet all the expenses."

Although

the obligations do not by their terms benefit only developing
countries, the Preamble indicates a sensitivity to the need to
assist developing countries in protecting heritage (together with
dealing with the fact that many situations such as protecting
natural heritage shared by more than one country, require
international efforts).
The Convention also contains many examples of contextual
norms that are fairly obviously directed at taking account of
countries' differing capabilities and resources.

For example,

some provisions contain contextual norms that turn specifically
on the state's capabilities and resources.

Article 4, which

contains the Convention's general duty to identify, protect,
conserve, present, and transmit heritage to future generations,
provides that each state "will do all it can to this end, to the
utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate, with any
international assistance and cooperation . . .
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it may be able to

obtain."

Article 5, which elaborates on that general duty,

obligates each state to endeavor to reach specified goals "in so
far as possible, and as appropriate for each country."
Similarly, the obligation in Article 11 to provide a heritage
inventory only extends "in so far as possible."
The World Heritage Convention thus effectively takes the
situation of developing countries into account by providing a
duty to assist -- apparently balanced by a duty to seek
assistance -- and by invoking contextual norms taking into
account factors characteristically of concern to developing
countries, such as the amount of available resources and
protective capabilities more generally.

C.

1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)

CITES is an attempt to protect endangered species by
regulating international trade in those species -- primarily via
prohibiting trade in certain endangered species except under
specified circumstances, requiring any export, re-export, or
import of those species to occur only pursuant to a permit
system, requiring any trade to occur under conditions designed to
ensure the survival of the specimen, and returning specimens
traded in violation of the Convention.65

CITES neither

specifically refers to developing countries nor provides
differential treatment to them in any other fashion.
Almost all obligations in CITES are stated in absolute
terms.

The only expressly contextual norms are found in articles
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8 and 13.

Paragraph 1 of Article 8, which is critical to CITES

because it contains the parties' basic obligation, provides that
parties "shall take appropriate measures" to enforce the
Convention and to prohibit trade in violation thereof.

Paragraph

3 of article 8 states that parties shall process specimens with a
minimum of delay "[a]s far as possible."

Article 13(2) provides

that parties should respond to inquiries from the Secretariat
established by CITES "as soon as possible."

The references to

"possible" indicate a contextual norm that takes into account
resources and regulatory and other capabilities.

The meaning of

the term "appropriate" in article 8(1) is less clear.
not permitted examining the travaux preparatoire.

Time has

On its face,

"appropriate" seems to require a contextual analysis:

how else

would one determine whether a particular action fit a particular
situation.

Whether that term would allow a less effective action

to be taken because of the characteristics of or resources
available to the actor (as would be allowed by the World Heritage
Convention), is less obvious.
Unless "appropriate" does allow a contextual analysis
sensitive to the conditions in developing countries, CITES is
somewhat unusual in stating its major obligations virtually
entirely in absolute terms.

This situation may have arisen

because the official actions required (e.g., export and import
control) were thought to be well within the competence of
developing and developed countries alike, or because the
interests sought to be protected by CITES were viewed as being of
very high priority (perhaps especially to some developing
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countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, India, China).

The travaux

preparatoire may contain answers to these questions.

r

It must

also be recalled that CITES, like the World Heritage Convention,
was drafted before 1974, when NIEO first was officially and
formally recognized.

D.

1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, and the Accompanying Resolution and
Declaration

This Convention was drafted and adopted within the framework
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).66

Also adopted

were a Resolution on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution^ and
a Declaration on Low- and Non-Waste Technology and Re-Utilization
and Recycling of Wastes.68

Although the ECE has only 34 members,
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the Convention is of general interest because it was the first
major multilateral effort to combat transboundary air pollution.
The Convention and Resolution do not specifically mention
developing countries or provide them differential treatment.

The

preamble to the Convention refers to "the pertinent provisions"
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.

The only principle

specifically mentioned is Principle 21; but the Stockholm
Conference was so permeated by the question of how developing
countries should be treated that a reference to that issue
probably should be inferred.

Even such an inference falls short

of differential treatment, of course.

The 1979 Waste

Declaration, however, recommends in paragraph 5(b) that
international cooperative activities occur within the framework
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of ECE to exchange scientific and technical information "taking
into account the interests of ECE countries that are developing
from an economic point of view."
The Convention contains numerous contextual norms that are
either implicitly or explicitly sensitive to economic
development.

Article 2 states that the parties are determined to

protect man and the environment against air pollution and "shall
endeavor to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and
prevent air pollution . . . ."

Article 4 also includes an

obligation (regarding information exchange and policy review)
modified by the words "as far as possible."

Article 6 commits

parties "to develop the best policies and strategies [and]
control measures compatible with balanced development, in
particular by using the best available technology which is
economically feasible" (emphasis supplied).

Article 7 requires

parties to initiate and cooperate in research or development
regarding six areas "as appropriate to [the party's] needs."
The Resolution includes contextual elements in paragraph 1
to implement the Convention even before it is in force "to the
maximum extent possible" and in paragraph 4 to limit air
pollution "as far as possible."

The Declaration contains one

such provision in paragraph 5(d), stating that certain
educational programs be self-supporting "as far as possible."
The Convention, as well as its accompanying Resolution and
Declaration, thus contain a variety of contextual rules, most
probably demonstrating sensitivity to the condition of developing
countries and to the practical realities facing air-pollution-
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control efforts generally.

The Declaration also calls for

differential treatment of developing countries in one area.

E.

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)

UNCLOS

6 9 was the product of years of negotiations that

continuously considered the claims, interests, and political
significance of developing countries. 70u

The Preamble speaks not

only of the "equitable and efficient utilization of the
resources" of the seas and the "realization of a just and
equitable international economic order," but also to "tak[ing]
into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and,
in particular, the special interests and needs of developing
countries, whether coastal or land-locked"

(emphasis supplied).

UNCLOS provides a series of environmental norms specific to
particular aspects or areas covered by the Convention.
no mention of developing countries.
general obligation:

Most make

Article 192 provides the

"States have the obligation to protect and

preserve the marine environment."

Articles 194 (Measures to

prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment),
195 (Duty not to transfer damage or hazards or transform one type
of pollution into another), 196 (Use of technologies or
introduction of alien or new species), 197 (Co-operation on a
global or regional basis), 198 (Notification of imminent or
actual damage), 199 (Contingency plans against pollution), 200
(Studies, research programmes and exchange of information and
data), 201 (Scientific criteria for regulations), 204 (Monitoring

of the risks or effects of pollution), 205 (Publication of
reports), 206 (Assessment of potential effects of activities),
213-222 (the enforcement provisions), 223-233 (Safeguards), 234
(ice-covered areas), and 235 (Responsibility and liability), deal
with other aspects of environmental protection but make no
mention of developing countries.
Most of the articles that cover specific sources of
pollution also do not provide differential treatment, including
article 208 (Pollution from sea-bed activities subject to
national jurisdiction), 209 (Pollution from activities in the
deep seabed -- see also article 145), 210 (Pollution by dumping),
211 (Pollution from vessels), and 212 (Pollution from or through
the atmosphere).

However, article 207 (Pollution from land-based

sources) provides that states, in endeavoring to establish
regional and global approaches, shall "tak[e] into account
characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of
developing States and their need for economic development."
(Some of these articles provide that policies are to be
harmonized on a regional basis (articles 207(3) and 208(4)),
which is related to claims by developed countries.7 1 )
There is another aspect of marine environmental protection
regarding which UNCLOS provides differential treatment:
assistance in meeting environmental norms.

Article 202 obligates

states to provide scientific, educational, technical and other
assistance for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, to "provide appropriate assistance, especially to
developing States," to minimize the effects of major incidents,
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and to "provide appropriate assistance, especially to developing
States," concerning preparation of environmental assessments
(emphasis supplied).

Article 203 further provides that

developing countries be granted preference by international
organizations in allocating funds and technical assistance and
utilizing specialized services.

The general scheme is thus that

UNCLOS's environmental standards do not provide differential
treatment to developing countries except (1) with respect to one
aspect of land-based pollution and (2) that they require
developed countries and, to a lesser extent, international
organizations to assist developing countries in meeting those
standards.
Many of the foregoing provisions involve contextual norms.
Most significantly, article 194, which specifies measures to
prevent, reduce and control marine pollution, provides t h a t : ^
States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate,
all measures consistent with this Convention that are
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose
the best practicable means at their disposal and in
accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavor
to harmonize their policies in this connection.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Article 207(4) expressly directs that the

economic capacity of developing countries and their need to
develop be considered, as indicated above.
UNCLOS thus requires differential treatment and contextual
treatment.

The predominant approach, however, is to eschew

differential treatment in favor of contextual treatment, except
in the provisions regarding pollution from land-based sources and

assistance to developing countries from other states and from
international organizations.
F.

1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer

The Montreal Protocol773 gives specific substance to the more
general provisions of the Vienna Convention.74

The Vienna

Convention Preamble refers to "the circumstances and particular
requirements of developing countries."

Article 2, which contains

the Convention's general obligations, provides that parties
"shall, in accordance with the means at their disposal and their
capabilities," undertake certain measures.

Article 4, which

elaborates regarding legal, scientific, and technical
cooperation, provides that states shall cooperate in promoting
the development and transfer of technology, "taking into account
in particular the needs of the developing countries."

The

Convention thus contains differential treatment and contextual
treatment.
The Montreal Protocol follows the Vienna Convention in those
respects.

The Preamble "[a ]cknowledg[es] that special provision

is required to meet the needs of developing countries for
[substances that cause depletion of the ozone layer]," and it
speaks of the need "to control equitably total global emissions
of [such substances]."

Article 10 provides a duty to cooperate

in promoting technical assistance that is to "tak[e] into account
in particular the needs of developing countries," and it states
that workplans "shall pay special attention to the needs and
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circumstances of the developing countries."

Article 2 provides
♦

the basic obligations of the Protocol to control consumption and
production of specified ozone-depleting substances, referred to
as "controlled substances."

Article 2, by reference to article

5, distinguishes between developing countries whose annual
consumption of controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms
(two-thirds of a pound) per capita -- which includes virtually
all developing countries

-- and all other countries.

Countries not meeting the developing country/0.3 kg. test
are required by article 2 to freeze their consumption of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for each 12-month period at 1986
levels; production of CFCs must be frozen at 1986 levels except a
10 percent increase is permitted to satisfy needs of states
meeting the developing country/0.3 kg. test or for industrial
rationalization (which involves transfer of production from one
party to another and thus no net increase in production);
consumption must be reduced 20 percent by 1994, and a further 30
percent by 1999 (a total of 50 percent); and production must be
decreased by similar amounts, with a possible upward variation of
10 percent allowed on the same grounds mentioned above.

The

consumption and production of halons (the other major group of
ozone-depleting substances covered by the Protocol) are to be
frozen at 1986 levels, again with an increase of 10 percent
allowed for the reasons mentioned above.

These countries thus

must freeze and, for CFCs, reduce their consumption and
production, with a net increase in production possible only to
meet needs of developing countries.
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Countries that do meet the developing country/0.3 kg. test
are treated quite differently, and at least ostensibly more
favorably.

Article 5 allows such countries to delay compliance

with the standards in article 2 by 10 years, as long as it does
so to meet domestic needs and as long as it does not exceed the
0.3 kg. threshold.

Flexible measurement methods are also

allowed.
Article 5 thus provides differential treatment in that it
allows developing/0.3 kg. countries to avoid reductions and
freezes required of all other parties.
perspective:

But there is another

developing/0.3 kg. countries cannot exceed a per

capita annual consumption of 0.3 kg., whereas many developed
countries are so high above that level now that they will exceed
it many times over even after reducing their consumption by 50
percent.

The benefits available from CFC and halon use will thus

not be available to developing countries to the same extent they
have been and will be available to such developed countries.
There is another instance in which developing countries may
be seen to be disadvantaged by the Protocol.

Article 2(b) allows

a country not meeting the developing country/0.3 kg. test to add
to 1986 production any facilities that are under construction or
contracted for by Sept. 16, 1987 (the date the Protocol was
signed) and that were provided for in national legislation (e.g.,
a five-year plan), as long as they are completed by December 31,
1990 and the production does not raise the party's per capita
consumption above 0.5 kg.

The principal beneficiary of this
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provision appears to be the U.S.S.R.; 7 5 it might also have been
♦
beneficial to some developing countries.

V.

CONCLUSION
Powerful political, practical, and moral reasons exist to

involve developing countries in the effort to protect the
biosphere and to fashion policies and legal norms that will
promote, or at least avoid hampering, the effort to improve the
standard of living of present and future generations of
individuals living in those countries.
Such legal norms can take three general forms.

One form is

to provide what I refer to as differential treatment to
developing countries per se, i.e., the norm by its terms can
provide different treatment to developing countries.

The second

|

form is what I call contextual treatment, i.e., the norm, without
specifically mentioning developing countries, requires or allows
consideration of factors that typically vary according to the
economic-development situation in a country.

The third general

form of norm is what I refer to as absolute norms, i.e., norms
that do not differentiate between developing and developed
countries and that do not require or allow contextual treatment.
Norms providing differential treatment or contextual
treatment can be directed at, or have the effect of, benefiting
developing countries in a variety of ways.

For example, they

can: impose additional burdens on developed countries or
international organizations vis-a-vis developing countries;
require that future conventional regimes take developing
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countries' interests into account; provide lower standards of
care for developing countries than are required for developed
countries; or require developing countries to pay less in
compensation (or other forms of reparation) than would be
required of otherwise similarly situated developed countries.
Such norms -- particularly those providing differential treatment
-- may also have the perhaps unintended effect of disadvantaging
developing countries.

Absolute norms might conceivably be

constructed so as to benefit developing countries, but my
preliminary research has not revealed any examples of that.
Although absolute norms predominate, the contemporary
international legal system is replete with differential norms and
contextual norms.

Instances of each type occur in the evolving

and interconnected areas of economic-development, human-rights,
and environmental law.

Indeed, there probably is an existing

general customary obligation, stemming primarily from state
practice in those three areas, to take the effect on economic
development in developing countries into account -- in order to
foster, or at least avoid interfering with, such development -when fashioning international environmental norms.

If such a

norm is not already de lata, it is de ferenda (in the process of
coming into existence).
The most important customary international environmental
principles already contain a contextual element, although this is
not always expressed.

The conventional environmental regimes

examined in this paper reflect widely differing resolutions of
the desirability of providing standards sensitive to disparities
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in economic development and contain various mixtures of absolute,
differential, and contextual norms.

Those differences presumably

reflect the different types of behavior and threats with which
the regimes were concerned, and thus are not to be deplored.
Indeed, such a rich menu of possible approaches should be
welcomed, as long as the underlying concern for the social and
economic well-being of present and future generations of
individuals throughout the world is the predominant factor in
choosing which approach is most appropriate for a particular
situation.
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force, but many of its provisions are commonly viewed as

